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RESPONSE TO BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS
JANET DOLGIN*

Birth Rights and Wrongs1 challenges limitations in the law’s response to tort
claims by people who have suffered reproductive wrongs. Arguing for a more
flexible understanding of tort law in response to reproductive wrongs, Professor
Fox offers a multitude of insights about the implications of negligent errors that
have resulted in non-birth (reproduction deprived), unwanted birth (reproduction
imposed), and the birth of children who upset parental hopes and expectations
about a child’s physical or mental condition (reproduction confounded).
This comment employs an anthropological lens to consider the implications
of the merging of values undergirding visions of family (including reproduction)
with the values of the marketplace. A social transformation, manifest for more
than a half-century, has conflated values presumed separate by the worldview
that served as a foundation for the Industrial Revolution—those of the family,
on the one hand, and those of the marketplace, on the other. Concerns about that
transformation, especially with regard to the parent-child relationship, explain
some part of judicial reluctance to remedy reproductive “wrongs.”
By the end of the twentieth century, and despite pockets of significant dissent,
Western society had largely accepted an understanding of adults within families
that encompassed marketplace values. Adult spouses and partners were
increasingly viewed as autonomous individuals, able to negotiate the terms of
their own relationships—and, equally, to re-negotiate those terms. Society has
been less ready to apply that view to children and to the parent-child relationship.
More broadly, by the second half of the twentieth century, marketplace
values,identified in the nineteenth century by Sir Henry Maine as those beholden
to “contract,”began to appear in social arenas previously separated from the
marketplace—preeminently, the domain of family,an arena that Maine
characterized through reference to relationships of “status.”2 That conflation
challenged central presumptions about family and personhood, including
gender, that characterized Western society for over two centuries after the start
of the Industrial Revolution. A world grounded in contract assumes negotiated
relationships that endure only as long as those involved choose for them to
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endure. In contrast, a world grounded in status supports fixed social roles and
hierarchical relationships that, once formed, are expected to endure. Particularly
in the United States, until the second half of the twentieth century, the presumed
differences between home and work were understood through the contrasting
metonyms of money and love.3
The separation of tort law from contract law, and then the expansion of
successful tort claims into new spheres (those, for instance, of “libel, slander,
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and the “right to
privacy”)4 preceded society’s open readiness to envision family relationships, at
least those between adults, through the presumptions of the marketplace. The
readiness of American tort law to respond to negligence that results in
reproduction deprived, imposed, or confounded, depends in large part on the
readiness of society broadly to view the parent-child relationship in similar
terms.
Many of the disputes occasioned by assisted reproduction reflect similar
ambivalence and uncertainty about shifts in the familial domain. These cases
have involved intending parents, surrogates, or gamete donors who entered into
contracts in contemplation of the conception and birth of a child. Responses to
these disputes have reflected the level of society’s readiness to define the
creation—though not necessarily the implementation—of the parent-child
relationship through marketplace values. While families may be created in the
marketplace—involving, for instance, payment to and contracts between
surrogate mothers and intending parents—it is not yet clear whether and how
changes in the mode through which families are created affects forms of
interaction within families, specific relationships, and understandings of
personhood. It remains similarly unclear whether, and if so how, compensation
for those suffering from reproductive wrongs will affect family relationships
and, more particularly, relationships between parents and children.
In the realm of assisted reproduction, social analysts and psychologists have
entertained such questions at least since the In re Baby M5 case, considered by
courts in New Jersey in the late 1980s. The case involved a custody dispute
between a so-called “traditional” surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, and the
baby’s intending (genetic) father, William Stern and his wife, Elizabeth Stern,
the intending mother.6 The New Jersey trial court held for the Sterns in almost
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every regard. It provided for the termination of Whitehead’s maternity, granted
William Stern full custody of the child, and provided for Elizabeth Stern to adopt
the baby.7 The state’s highest court overturned almost every aspect of the lower
court’s decision, invalidating the contract entered into by the parties, restoring
Whitehead’s maternal rights, and voiding Elizabeth Stern’s adoption of the
child.8 Yet both courts, despite their profound disagreements about applicable
law and about the proper outcome, favored a similar vision of family and of the
parent-child relationship.9 Both courts rejected an understanding of family that
depended on marketplace values. And both courts sought to buttress traditional
family values, including loyalty, fixed statuses, and enduring relationships. Of
particular significance, the lower court’s view of the manner in which families
could (or should) be created did not harmonize with the court’s underlying vision
of the ideal family, a vision almost identical to that of the state supreme court
which expected families to reflect the presumptions of a world grounded on
status, not contract.10
Over two decades ago, and a little more than a decade after Baby M, people
began to offer significant amounts of money to egg donors with specific traits.
One couple placed an advertisement in the newspapers of several elite
universities offering to pay $50,000 for the ova of a tall, smart egg donor.11
Many women responded to the advertisement. Interviewed on CNN, the lawyer
for the couple who placed the advertisement explained that the couple, though
themselves tall and smart (thus presumptively explaining their interest in a tall,
smart child), would love any child produced through the donated ova, even if
the child were short “or not so smart.”12 Even here, the lawyer seemed to
proclaim, the values of the traditional family trumped those of the marketplace.
The lawyer’s statement spawns a slew of questions: would this family be
diminished, despite the parents’ presumptive love for any child, by the parents’
having paid for the ovum that led to the child’s conception, whether or not the
child satisfied the couple’s pre-conception wishes? Under what circumstances
does an adult—a parent—view a child as his or her own? Are love and money
now the currencies of both the home and the marketplace? And, if so, how does
that amalgamation affect relationships between parents and children, if at all?
These questions are occasioned by agreements providing for payment to
gestational mothers and by a couple’s readiness to pay tens of thousands of
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dollars for ova from women with particular traits. They are also occasioned,
though less directly and perhaps less transparently, by negligence cases
grounded on claims about reproductive wrongs. Does receipt of—or even
recognition of the right to seek—compensation for reproduction confounded or
reproduction unwanted alter relationships between a child and others, including
parents, grandparents, and siblings? And if so, is that problematic?
At best, answering these questions will take years of lived experience and of
nuanced, well-designed research. Even then, research results are likely to be
equivocal. Society remains uncertain about the implications of defining aspects
of the parent-child relationship through the presumptions of the marketplace,
and it remains ambivalent about shifts in family relationships—especially those
between parents and children—that increasingly apply the presumptions of the
marketplace to relationships within families. That said, families have always
changed and will continue to change. Analysis of these changes will elude truly
objective assessment because, inevitably, such analyses flow from the analyst’s
vision of family relationships and personhood.

